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OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN D^M - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801 538-1015 • EAX NO. 801-538 1121 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
March 28, 1990 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State of Utah v. Parrel E. Brady 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Respondent, the State of Utah, has filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition in the above-referenced case based on 
defendant's untimely filing of the Petition for Certiorari. 
Contemporaneously, defendant has filed a Request for Extension of 
Time to file his petition. 
Should the Court allow defendant an extension of time 
to file the petition, respondent would waive the right to file a 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant 
to Rule 47(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does 
not constitute a stipulation that the petition should be granted, 
but rather, it is respondent's position that the petition should 
be denied based upon the legal analysis contained in the brief of 
respondent, the supplement brief of respondent and the opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to this letter. In 
the event that the Court deems an additional response by the 
State necessary to its determination, a Barief in Opposition will 
be provided. 
Thank you for your consideration* 
Very truly 
O/^ 
CFS:bks 
cc: Darrel E. Brady, pro se 
Enclosure 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
— - H — — 
MAR 't V WW 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A DENIAL OF A MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF GUILTY, IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE FRANK 
G. NOEL, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Casfe No. 880278-CA 
v. : 
DARREL E. BRADY, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1 
This appeal is from the denial df a motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTEE) ON APPEAL 
The following issue is presented} in this appeal: 
Did the trial court properly deity defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea of guilty? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and rul^s for a determination 
of this case are, in pertinent part: 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (Supp. 1989). Withdrawal of Pleai 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of court. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978). Habitual Criminal-
Determination t 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the 6econd degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1002 (1978). Habitual Criminal-Procedure 
Punishmentt 
(1) In charging a person with being a 
habitual criminal, the information or 
complaint filed before the committing 
magistrate shall allege the felony committed 
within the state of Utah and the two or more 
felony convictions relied upon by the state 
of Utah. 
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the 
district court for trial, the county attorney 
shall in the information or complaint set 
forth the felony committed within the state 
of Utah and the two or more previous felony 
convictions relied upon for the charge of 
being a habitual criminal.... 
Utah Code Ann. £ 77-13-1 (Supp. 1989). Kinds of Pleasx 
There are five kinds of pleas in an 
indictment or information: 
(1) Not guilty; 
(2) Guilty; 
(3) No contest; 
(4) Not guilty by reason of insanity; 
and 
(5) Guilty and mentally ill. 
An alternative plea of not guilty or not 
guilty by reason of insanity may be entered. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-32*1 (Supp. 1989). Minimum Standards 
Provided by County for Defense of Indigent Defendants! 
The following are minimum standards to be 
provided by each county, city, and town for 
the defense of indigent persons in criminal 
cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(5) Include the taking of a first 
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be in 
the interest of justice except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
Defendant was charged by amended information with 
escape, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-309 (1978); aggravated arson, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (1978) ; and being a 
habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1978); (R. 92-93). On April 23, 1985, defendant, through a plea 
bargain arrangement, entered an "Alford" guilty plea to a lesser 
charge of attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony. The 
remaining charges of escape and being a habitual criminal were 
dismissed (R. 138). The Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, Third 
Judicial District, sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run 
consecutively with defendant's then present sentences (R. 139). 
The aggravated arson statute was amended in 1986 to make it a 
first degree offense. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant's conviction was in 1985 and therefore a second degree 
felony. 
^ 
On November 10, 1987, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea of guilty to attempted aggravated arson (R. 
146-63; R. 164-79). An evidentiary hearing was conducted on 
January 8, 1988 before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court (R. 202, 225). The matter was taken 
under advisement (R. 202). On March 28, 1988, defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty was formally denied (R. 211). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was convicted on March 25, 1981 by jury trial 
of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping and theft of a motor 
vehicle (R. 147). He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
the indeterminate term of five years to life (R. 15, 147). On 
August 21, 1984, while still an inmate, defendant escaped from 
the Medium Security Facility of the Utah State Prison. He was 
apprehended outside the prison the same day (Brief of App., 
Statement of Facts). The morning of the escape, a fire was 
started in the Industrial Building of the Utah State Prison (R. 
93; Brief of App., Statement of Facts). The State contended that 
the fire was started as a diversion to aid defendant's escape (R. 
51). 
On August 22, 1984, defendant was charged with escape 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Case No. CR 84-1104 (R. 3). 
The case was assigned to Judge Jay E. Banks and trial set for 
January 31, 1985 (R. 24). Mr. Glenn Iwasaki, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, was appointed to represent defendant (R. 
4). 
Several weeks after defendant was arrested on the 
escape, the State's arson investigation was completed (R. 52). 
Defendant was then charged with aggravated arson and being a 
habitual criminal, Third Judicial District Court Case No. CR-84-
1346. Mr. Iwasaki was also appointed to rfepresent defendant in 
2 
the arson case (T. 6-7). 
During his representation of defendant, Mr. Iwasaki 
undertook plea bargain negotiations with the county attorney (T. 
16). In a letter dated January 14, 1985, Mr. Iwasaki informed 
defendant of a proposed plea bargain (T. 16-17; Exhibit A). Mr. 
Iwasaki's intention was to have defendant plead to a third degree 
felony, reduced from a second degree felony. In exchange, the 
other charges of escape and being a habitual criminal would be 
dismissed (T. 18). 
After defendant received Mr. Iwasaki's letter, 
defendant informed counsel he wished to proceed pro se (T. 17). 
A motion was submitted to the trial court (T. 17; R. 26-27). 
After hearing, defendant was allowed to proceed pro se with Mr. 
Iwasaki assisting (T. 4, 11, 17; R. 31). 
In preparation for trial, defendant successfully moved 
pro se for the appointment of a fingerprint expert, an 
investigator, an arson expert, and a psychiatrist (T. 11-12; R. 
57-61, 77, 81, 83). At defendant's request, a transcript of the 
Transcripts of the hearings on the Motion to Withdraw dated 
December 11, 1987 and January 8, 1988 are included in a single 
supplemental index (R. 225). The pages have not been paginated 
on appeal. To avoid confusion, reference will be made to the 
substantive hearing on January 8 as (T. ) and to the December 
11th hearing as (T~ ). 
preliminary hearing on defendant's arson charge was prepared (R. 
78). Additionally, "quite a few" subpoenas were served to secure 
defense witnesses (T. 13); in his brief, defendant claims fifty-
eight (58) subpoenas. Defendant also received a suit and shoes 
from his family for trial (T. 12). 
On April 23, 1985, the morning of the trial, the county 
attorney approached both defendant and Mr. Iwasaki "to consider 
the possibility of pleading to a third degree [felony]." (T. 
13). Subsequently, a pre-trial meeting was held in chambers (T. 
13, 22). Defcmdant in his pro se capacity represented that he 
would not plead to "anything arson related," but would plead to 
"anything escape related" (T. 15-16). 
During the discussion which ensued, the possibility of 
an "Alford" plea was discussed. Both Mr. Iwasaki and Judge Banks 
explained to defendant that an "Alford" plea was not an admission 
of guilt, but could be entered to avoid higher penalties (T. 20). 
Defendant agreed to enter an "Alford" plea to a third degree 
3 
felony in exchange for the other charges being dismissed. 
Directly after the fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minute 
meeting, defendant entered an "Alford" plea to the reduced charge 
of attempted aggravated arson (R. 22, 136-38). All remaining 
charges were dismissed (R. 138). Defendant waived time for 
sentencing and was immediately sentenced to the statutory term of 
one to five years (R. 139). 
The initial negotiations involved a plea to arson; however, the 
plea was entered to attempted aggravated arson. Both charges are 
third degree felonies. Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-102, 103 and 76-4-
nn<> iiQ-iow Mr TwARaki. who was advising defendant, stated his 
No direct appeal of defendant's conviction was taken. 
Some two and one-half years later, on November 10, 
1987# defendant, pro se, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea claiming that Judge Banks had improperly participated in 
plea negotiations, coercing defendant into entering a plea (R. 
146-63). An evidentiary hearing was held >^n January 8, 1988 (T. 
3-28). On February 29, 1988, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, 
Third District Court, denied defendant's motion finding that: 
Defendant has failed to show good cause as to 
why his plea should be set aside. The terms 
of the plea negotiation were discussed and 
outlined in correspondence between the 
prosecutor and defense counsel before the 
parties appeared in court for entry of the 
plea. Judge Banks made a finding that the 
plea was voluntarily made and defendant has 
failed to produce evidence to support his 
claim that the plea was coerced and therefore 
a nullity, or for any other reason that the 
plea should be set aside. 
(R. 203). 
On April 28, 1988, defendant appealed from the denial 
of his motion to withdraw his plea (R. 216-24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTf 
Because the defendant has failed to include the 
transcript of his plea as part of the recbrd on appeal, this 
Court should limit its review to whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea 
and presume that defendant's plea fully complied with Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. [ 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in that 
there was no evidence to establish defendant's plea was coerced 
or otherwise entered improperly. Defendant's conviction should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME DEFENDANT'S PLEA 
WAS PROPERLY ENTERED AND LIMIT ITS REVIEW TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11, (Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11 (1978), 
amended 1989), sets forth the procedure a court must follow 
before accepting a guilty plea. It provides: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily 
made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court 
the witnesses against him, and that by 
entering the plea he waives all of those 
rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the offense to 
which he is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for each offense to which 
a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior pleas discussion and 
pleas agreement and if so, what agreement 
has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a 
plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shall 
be approved by the court. . . . 
Although defendant makes a wide variety of claims, the thrust of 
his assertion is that his plea was coerced, and therefore 
4 involuntarily entered in violation of Rule 11(e)(2). 
While trial courts carry the burden of ensuring that 
guilty pleas are entered in compliance wit^ i Rule 11(e), State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); withdrawing a guilty plea is a 
privilege, and not a right. State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040, 
1041 (Utah 1987). The rationale which allows a guilty plea to be 
withdrawn is to protect against a plea which is entered 
unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily. Iji. To 
accomplish this, w[t]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against 
him,w State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, quoting McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded by rule, 857 
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988). As a general rule, judges may not 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11 was amended in 1989 and redesignated. 
To avoid any confusion with the record, respondent will refer to 
the pre-1989 rule structure as found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 
(1978). 
rely solely on defense counsel or affidavits, even if properly 
executed, to ensure a defendant's understanding of his rights. 
Id. 
How€?ver, when an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, a reviewing court must assume regularity in the 
proceedings below. Jolivet v. Cook, No. 880341, slip op. at 5 
(Utah S. Ct. Aug. 22, 1989); State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 
1988). The burden of showing error is on appellant. State v. 
Marcum, 750 P.2d at 603. 
When a defendant predicates error to this 
Court, he has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting such allegation by an adequate 
record. Absent that record, defendant's 
assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the review court has no 
power to determine. This Court simply cannot 
rule on a question which depends for its 
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by 
the record. 
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988), quoting State 
v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 
U.S. 1044 (1983). 
In the case at bar, defendant has not provided any 
transcript of his plea on April 23, 1985. Consequently, this 
Court should presume that the guilty plea was entered in full 
compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and limit appellate review to 
consideration of whether the lower court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw the plea. Such 
an approach is particularly appropriate where any review of 
defendant's plea would be under the Htotality of the record" 
standard of Warner v, Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985)- State v. 
Hickman, No. 880362 (Utah S. Ct. August 17, 1989). Here, in view 
of defendant's written affidavit in support of his plea (R. 136-
37) and his advisory counsel's testimony that the plea was 
voluntary (T. 20-22), the "record as a whole" would reflect a 
validly entered plea. Id. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
On appeal, defendant claims his guilty plea was coerced 
and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw 
his plea. Sines Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (Supp. 1989) allows "a 
plea of guilty , . . [to] be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of court/' a reviewing court will reverse the 
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea "only when it 
clearly appears the trial court has abused its discretion" in 
determining that no good cause existed. State v. Vasilacopulos/ 
756 P.2d at 93f citing State v. Mildenhal^, 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987). S$e also State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 895 (Utah 
1988). 
A. There Is No Evidence that Defendant's 
Plea Was Coerced. 
The h^art of defendant's contention is that the trial 
court improperly initiated plea bargain d iscussions on the 
morning of trial, in violation of Utah R. Ckrim. P. 11(f) (1978). 
Further, defendant alleges Judge Banks stated that if defendant 
did not accept the proposed plea bargain and was convicted on the 
pending charges, defendant would never get out of prison. The 
record does not substantiate either claims 
Defendant claims "the court, on its own, had 
[defendant] brought from [a] holding room, along with his stand 
by attorney, Mr. Glen Iwasaki, to court chambers . . • and 
proceeded to intimidate and coerce appellant to plead guilty." 
(Br. App. 5). The evidence from the evidentiary hearing 
established instead that the prosecutor approached defendant, 
proceeding pro se, to extend the plea bargain offer prior to any 
pre-trial meeting in chambers. 
Q: [Defendant pro se]; Coming to the 
morning of trial, did you on that morning 
at any time — was there anybody that 
approached you concerning any plea 
negotiations? 
A: [Mr. Glenn Iwasaki]: On the morning of 
trial? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I believe that there was some discussion 
at that time of whether or not we could 
resolve the issues of this case to plead 
to a third degree arson. 
Q: Was this between you and I or some other 
party? 
A: It would have to be instituted by the 
county attorney's office. And I believe 
it was Mr. D'Elia at the time who 
approached, I believe both of us, because 
you were acting as your own attorney, to 
consider the possibility of pleading to a 
third degree. 
Q: Is it also correct while we was in that 
holding room, the bailiff came or someone 
from the court and told us to enter judge 
Bank's chambers? 
A: I recall being in Judge Bank's chambers. 
How we got there is foggy. 
Q: Do you recall who all was present? 
A: I believe you and I, Mr. D'Elia and Judge 
Banks. I believe the bailiff was in 
there. I don't recall if a reporter was 
in there or not. 
Q: Do you remember what was said or even 
part of what was said during hearing in 
the room in Judge's chambers, Mr. 
Iwasaki? 
A: Not verbatim. I can generalize about may 
recollection of the conversation. 
Q: Please do. 
A: My recollection was that you were 
prepared to go to trial. You had jury 
instructions prepared, witnesses 
subpoenaed and that there wa^ an offer at 
that time for you to plead to a lessor 
charge. 
Q: Who made the offer? 
A: My recollection was Mr. D'El|a. 
(T. 12-14). 
Utah R. Crim P. 11(f) provides in pertinent part: 
The judge shall not participate |n plea 
discussions prior to any agreement being made 
by the prosecuting attorney, but once a 
tentative plea agreement has been reached 
which contemplates entry of a plea in the 
expectation that other charges will be 
dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request 
of the parties, may permit the disclosure to 
him of such tentative agreement and the 
reasons therefor in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea. The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. . . . 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not encouraged a trial 
court's participation in plea negotiations, such involvement has 
not automatically voided an otherwise voluntary and lawfully 
entered guilty plea. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 
1986). 
Here, the county attorney made the plea proposal to 
defendant and his counsel outside chambers. The parties then 
appeared in-chambers to discuss pre-trial matters. Defendant's 
presence was required because he was acting pro se. Apparently, 
the trial court, at that point, was informed of the plea 
proposal. This was not a case where the court could initially 
confer with counsel privately; defendant was counsel. State v. 
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301 n.7. Further, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that either defendant pro se, his advisory 
counsel or the county attorney objected to the in-chambers 
conference. 
The record is clear that there were no threats or 
intimation of dire consequences (T. 23). There was no mention of 
increased penalties or otherwise being punished for the exercise 
of the right to go to trial (T. 23). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, he was not told that if he declined the plea bargain 
and was convicted, he would never get out of prison (T. 25). 
Instead, the record reveals that after the bargain was offered by 
the county attorney, a discussion ensued after which defendant, 
acting pro se but with the concurrence of advisory counsel, chose 
to accept the plea bargain (T. 15, 21). There is no evidence 
from which to conclude that the plea was not voluntarily entered. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying 
The only information in the record as to what occurred in-
chambers is Mr. Iwasaki's testimony during the motion to withdraw 
(T. 3-25). 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, ^olivet v. Cook, No. 
880341, slip op. at 4. 
Defendant also asserts the information contained a 
second or extra count of being a habitual criminal which had a 
coercive effect on defendant accepting the plea bargain. 
Defendant's allegation seems to stem from a misreading of the 
record. 
Defendant was initially charged with escape from 
official custody, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-309 (1978). A preliminary hearing was conducted 
and defendant was bound over for trial (R. 4). Based on 
subsequent investigations, the State separately charged defendant 
with aggravated arson and being a habitual criminal (R. 50-52, 
64-68). The State moved to join the escape charge as Count I and 
the aggravated arson charge as Count II, under Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-9 (1982), as both charges arose out of the same criminal 
episode and could have been joined in a single information (R. 
53-54). A single charge of being a habitual criminal, Count III, 
was included in the amended information based on a violation of 
either Count I or II and defendant's prior criminal record (R. 
92-93). 
Although defendant correctly asserts a defendant must 
be bound over before being charged with being a habitual 
criminal, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002(2) (1978), he misconstrues 
the amended information as charging two separate habitual 
criminal counts. Additionally, defendant misconceives the 
habitual criminal charge as a separate offense. It is not. The 
habitual criminal statute is not a substantive offense but merely 
a method of sentence enhancement once convicted. State v. 
Williams, 733 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 102 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (1989). Thus, by entering into the plea bargain, 
defendant was only convicted of a third degree felony punishable 
by an indeterminate term of not more than five years. If he had 
proceeded to trial and been convicted of either escape or 
aggravated arson, he would have faced an enhanced sentence of 
five years to life. The advisability of the plea where defendant 
had already admitted his guilt to one of the counts is obvious. 
Clearly, the "coercive" discussion alleged by defendant was an 
attempt by all concerned to help a pro se litigant fully 
understand his alternatives and the most advantageous course. 
B. Other Asserted Defects In Defendant's Plea Are 
Without Merit 
Defendant makes several other allegations, unrelated to 
coercion, presumably in an attempt to establish a defect in his 
guilty plea which would warrant its withdrawal. An examination 
of each his claims reveals they are without merit. 
Defendant challenges the legality of his "Alford" plea 
because the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 
1989) does not specifically mention "Alford" pleas. 
In the case of North Carolina v, Alford, 400 U,S. 25, 
37 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held: 
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both 
a waiver of trial and an express admission of 
guilt, the latter element is not a 
constitutional requisite to the imposition of 
criminal penalty. An individual accused of 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of 
a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or 
unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has held an otherwise 
valid guilty plea is not rendered involuntary if it is entered to 
avoid harsher penalties. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301, Most 
recently, the Court added "an accused can lawfully plead guilty 
to an offense for which he could not have been convicted if the 
plea is in exchange for a lessor sentence/' Hurst v. Cook, No. 
860075, slip op. at 14 (Utah S. Ct. June 30, 1989) (citations 
omitted). The rule is limited to cases "where the offense 
pleaded to is so related to the crime originally charged that an 
examination of the accused's record would ^ot be misleading as to 
the nature of the accused's criminal conduct." Id. 
In the present case, defendant's guilty plea was 
entered to attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony, 
reduced from aggravated arson, a second decree felony. 
Additionally, the State dismissed the charges of escape, a second 
degree felony, and being a habitual criminal, which would have 
enhanced either conviction to a first degree felony. The record 
is clear defendant understood the potential penalties if 
convicted (R. 23) and choose to enter an "jUford" plea to avoid 
the possibility of a higher penalty. 
Attempted aggravated arson is of the same genre as 
aggravated arson, one of the original charges filed against 
defendant. The State's theory was defendant had intentionally 
set the fire to create a diversion for his escape (R. 51). Under 
the facts, defendant's "conviction does not distort the nature of 
his criminal conduct or create a false impression concerning that 
conduct," Hurst, No. 860075, slip op. at 15. 
As previously outlined in Point I, supra, when an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, a 
reviewing court presumes regularity in the proceedings below. 
Jolivet v. Cook, No. 880341, slip op. at 5. In the present case, 
defendant raises claims which simply cannot be properly reviewed 
without a transcript of his plea. Specifically, defendant 
asserts 1) there is an inadequate factual basis to support his 
plea, 2) the plea bargain improperly substituted attempted 
aggravated arson in place of arson and 3) the colloquy between 
judge and defendant was inadequate. Without a transcript of the 
entry of the plea, this Court should decline to reach defendant's 
claims and presume defendant's plea was properly entered. 
Defendant further complains that because he pled to an 
"aggravated" offense, he has become adversely affected under a 
new prison classification scheme. Defendant's claim, even if 
true, does not represent sufficient grounds to allow his plea to 
be withdrawn. Defendant entered his plea in April, 1985 (R. 138) 
but complains he is now affected by a 1987 classification system. 
(Br. of App. 13.) Defendant does not assert that he 
misunderstood his sentence, State v. Smith, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
(1989), or the degree of crime to which he pled, State v. West, 
765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988). Nor, does he allege any illusory 
promises were made to him, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988) or bargains broken, State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986). Under these facte, a subsequent and unforseeable change 
in prison classifications cannot constitute a basis justifying 
the withdrawal of a valid plea. 
Defendant also argues the presentation of his argument 
during the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea was a "farce" 
because he was limited to two minutes. 
A review of the record demonstrates defendant was given 
ample opportunity to present his evidence (T. 3-28). The matter 
was then submitted on memorandum (T. 27). Defendant was not 
entitled to unlimited argument. All pertinent facts were 
considered by the court. Defendant's contention is without 
merit. 
Defendant's last claim is he was wrongfully denied the 
appointment of counsel to bring his motion to withdraw his plea. 
This claim is also without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) provides: 
The following are minimum standards to be 
provided by each county, city, and town for 
the defense of indigent person in criminal 
cases in the course and various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(5) Include the taking of a first 
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be in 
the interest of justice except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
Defendant did not seek an appeal of his conviction. 
The motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea was not a first 
appeal of right but rather a discretionary hearing. As such, 
under the language of the statute, defendant was not entitled to 
appointed counsel. 
Moreover, it appears defendant's only reason in moving 
for counsel was to obtain the defense file created by Mr. 
Iwasaki's during his representation of defendant. 
The Court: . . . . I have a serious 
question as to whether you're entitled to 
appointment of counsel at this stage of the 
proceeding. 
Defendant [pro se]: About the only thing I 
could argue myself — the only problem I 
would have is aligning — I know Mr. Iwasaki 
works for the county attorney now, and I'm 
going to need his file, and maybe an attorney 
can get it easier for me. It kind of creates 
a problem there. 
The Court: You mean the file he generated 
when he represented you? 
Defendant: Yes. 
The Court: Do you have any object to having 
Mr. Iwasaki produce that? 
Mr. Verhoef [deputy county attorney]: No, in 
fact, Mr. Iwasaki has represented to me he 
has a file available in his office. 
The Court: Why don't you have him produce it 
on the day of the hearing? Would that be 
sufficient if I gave you some time before the 
hearing to do that? 
Defendant: Yes, that would be fine. 
(T2. 6-7). 
Defendant made no further request for counsel. Under 
these circumstances, there was no error in not appointing 
counsel• 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests the trial court's ruling denying 
defendant'6 motion to withdraw his plea be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this tf£W) day of August, 1989 
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Attorney General 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
DARREL E. BRADY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880278-CA 
Category J^o. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
After both parties submitted briefs in this matter, the 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals determined that a supplemental 
transcript had been filed with the Court, such that, supplemental 
briefing would be appropriate. Therefore, Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief is submitted to clarify any issues raised by 
the inclusion of the supplemental transcript of the April 23, 
1985, entry of guilty plea by defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF T^E CASE 
In reference to the original State'$ brief, hereafter 
referred to as Br. of Resp., at 3, the statement that defendant 
entered an "Alford" guilty plea to a lesser charge of attempted 
aggravated arson, a third degree felony, is inaccurate. Based on 
the supplemental transcript, defendant entered an "Alford" guilty 
plea to a lesser charge of arson, a third degree felony (S.T. 4, 
10). 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In reference to Br. of Resp. at 6, the statement in the 
body of the summary and in footnote 3 that defendant entered a 
plea to attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony, is 
inaccurate. During the plea negotiations, defendant agreed to 
plead to a third degree felony arson-related charge (R. 17-19). 
Defendant prepared an affidavit stating his intention to enter a 
plea of guilty to simple arson, as a third degree felony (R. 136-
37). During the hearing for the entry of the plea, the trial 
court referred interchangeably to defendant pleading guilty to 
attempted aggravated arson (S.T. 3, 11) and arson (S.T. 4, 10, 
11). When the plea was formally entered, the following occurred: 
THE COURT: And to the charge under the 
amended information of aggravated arson, your 
former plea of not guilty is set aside, and 
to the charge of arson, a third degree felony 
as I've explained it to you, which occurred 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
about August 21st of 1984 in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953f as amended, in that the 
defendant, Darrell Eugene Brady, a party to 
the offense, did unlawfully and intentionally 
damage the structure of a building and said 
value of said destruction exceeded $5,000 by 
means of fire or explosives, what now is your 
plea, guilty or not guilty? 
MR. BRADY: Guilty, Your Honor, pursuant to 
the Alford. 
(S.T. 11) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court in the taking 
of the plea referred to simple arson but referenced the 
aggravated arson statute. While there is some confusion in the 
record, the majority of references, and the more explicit 
ARGUMENT 
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT I 
All of the State's argument in Point I of Br. of Resp. 
is correct. However, with the inclusion of the transcript of the 
April 23, 1985 entry of plea, this Court need not merely presume 
regularity in the proceedings below. Rather, applying the 
Warner-Brooks standard referred to, this Court may find that 
defendant's plea was voluntarily entered based on the record as a 
whole. 
Here, the trial court personally inquired of defendant 
as to his understanding and knowledge of: 
1. The purpose and effect of an "Afford" 
plea (S.T. 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11); 
2. The voluntary nature of the plea (S.T. 5-
6, 10). 
3. The nature of the charges filed against 
defendant and their possible penalties (S.T. 
3-4); 
4. The constitutional rights which defendant 
was waiving by entering a guilty plea, 
including the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and 
the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses in open court (S.T. 6-8); 
5. The state's burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime 
charged (S.T. 6-7); 
6. The nature of the charge to which he was 
pleading, including its elements, anqi 
possible penalties (S.T. 3-5, 10); 
7. The parameters of any plea bargain (S.T. 
3-5); and, 
8. The fact that the court was not bound by 
any sentencing recommendations in the plea 
bargain (S.T. 4). 
Based on the personal colloquy between the trial court and 
defendant, in addition to the affidavit of defendant made in 
anticipation of the entry of the plea, it is clear that the trial 
court fully complied with all procedural and constitutional 
requirements in the acceptance of defendant's gulty plea. 
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT II 
In reference to Br, of Resp. at 17, the supplemental 
transcript demonstrates clearly that defendant wanted to enter a 
guilty plea under "Alford" to avoid the harsher penalties of the 
crimes originally charged (S.T. 3, 5, 11). 
In reference to Br. of Resp. at 18, the State agrees 
that the plea anticipated and the plea entered was to arson, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102 
(1978). As such, while the order denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea should be affirmed, the judgment and commitment 
order should be corrected to reflect defendant's conviction for 
arson, a third degree felony, as opposed to attempted aggravated 
arson. Because the statutory sentences are the same, no 
correction of sentence is necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fc#u clay of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Supplemental Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Darrel E. Brady, p_ro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this 
_/f£^day of January, 1990. 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^ 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
Darrel E. Brady, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FEB A l??n 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 880278-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea to attempted aggravated arson, 
claiming the trial court improperly participated in the plea 
bargain agreement and his plea was not entered into voluntarily 
or knowingly. We affirm. 
In 1981, defendant was convicted of several crimes and 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. On August 21, 1984, 
while serving that sentence, a fire was started at the prison 
and shortly thereafter, defendant escaped. Defendant was 
apprehended outside the prison and charged w^th escape. 
Several weeks later, he was charged with aggravated arson and 
with being a habitual criminal. 
In January 1985, defendant's attorney informed defendant 
by letter of a proposed plea bargain in whicn defendant would 
plead to a third degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the 
escape and habitual criminal charges. After receiving the 
attorney's letter, defendant informed the attorney he wished to 
proceed pro se. 
On the morning of trial, the county attorney, defendant, 
his attorney, and the judge held a pre-trial meeting in 
chambers and discussed entering a plea. Although the record 
does not contain a transcript of the in-chamlbers discussion, 
the State and defendant agree that during the discussion, 
defendant was informed he could enter an Alflord plea to a third 
degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the escape and 
habitual criminal charges.1 Immediately after the meeting 
defendant, the prosecutor, his attorney and the judge entered 
the courtroom and discussed the plea arrangement. The court 
indicated that based upon the in-chambers discussion, defendant 
wanted to withdraw his plea of not guilty to aggravated arson 
and enter an Alford plea to attempted aggravated arson. The 
court then discussed some of the rights defendant was waiving, 
obtained defendants statement that the plea was free and 
voluntary and had defendant execute an affidavit. After that 
discussion, defendant's attorney stated that the plea defendant 
was entering was to simple arson. The court then stated 
And to the charge under the amended 
information of aggravated arson, your 
former plea of not guilty is set aside, 
and to the charge of arson, a third degree 
felony as I've explained to you, which 
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about August 21, 1984 in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, Darrell Eugene 
Brady, a party to the offense, did 
unlawfully and intentionally damage the 
structure of a building and said value of 
said destruction exceeded $5,000 by the 
means of fire or explosives, what now is 
your plea, guilty or not guilty. 
Defendant responded that his plea was guilty, pursuant to 
Alford. The affidavit defendant signed indicated that he was 
pleading guilty to the charge of arson, a third degree felony, 
pursuant to Alford. The judgment, however, states that 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated 
arson. 
Two years later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating: 
1. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the United 
States Supreme Court held that "[aln individual accused of a 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling to 
or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting 
the crime." 
Defendant has failed to show good cause as 
to why his plea should be set asitfe. The 
terms of the plea negotiation werfc 
discussed and outlined in correspondence 
between the prosecutor and defense counsel 
before the parties appeared in co^ irt for 
entry of the plea. Judge Banks m^de a 
finding that the plea was voluntarily made 
and defendant has failed to produce 
evidence to support his claim thap the 
plea was coerced and therefore a Nullity, 
or for any other reason that the £lea 
should be set aside. 
This appeal followed. 
Defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly 
participated in the plea bargain agreement a^ id coerced him to 
enter a plea. Generally, the trial court's participation in 
plea negotiations is not to be encouraged du0 to the danger 
that a trial court's participation might hav0 a coercive effect 
on defendant. State y. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 ((jtah 1986). 
Further, Rule 11 provides that the judge shall not participate 
in plea discussions prior to any agreement hy the prosecuting 
attorney and defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 771-35-11(8) (a) 
(1989). However, where there is no record evidence that the 
trial court participated in the agreement or that the judge's 
actions coerced defendant to plead guilty, Rule 11 is not 
violated. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301. In this cpse, the only 
indication that the trial judge participated in plea 
negotiations is defendant's recollection that the court 
explained to him that he could enter his plea pursuant to 
Alford and thereby not admit the acts supporting the charge. 
We therefore find that the record does not support the 
contention that the judge improperly particibated in the plea 
negotiations. 
Defendant also contends he was improperly convicted of 
attempted aggravated arson because the in-ch&mbers discussion 
led him to believe he was going to enter an ftlford plea to 
simple arson. In the transcript, the judge tefers to both a 
plea of attempted aggravated arson and a ple^ i of arson. Thus, 
defendant claims, he was confused when he pl^d guilty. The 
State concedes that the record from the taking of the guilty 
plea is confusing and agrees that the plea anticipated and 
entered was to arson. Accordingly, the Statfe requests that the 
sentence be corrected to reflect defendant•s conviction for 
arson. Further, because the statutory sentences are the same, 
the State claims, no correction of sentence lis required. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides, "A plea of guilty 
. . • may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court." Further the denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea will be reversed only when it clearly 
appears the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Because 
defendant entered his plea prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), we apply the test set forth in Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
310 (Utah 1985). See Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 93. According 
to that test, we examine whether the record as a whole 
establishes that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge 
and understanding of its consequences. Id. 
Defendant contends, and the record reflects, that when he 
entered his plea in court on the record, he understood he was 
pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to arson. Defendant also 
stated that there had not been any promises made to him other 
than that stated in court, and that he was freely and 
voluntarily entering the plea of guilty under Alford. 
Defendant stated that he understood by entering the plea he was 
waiving his constitutional rights, which the court had 
explained to him. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty 
pursuant to Alford. After the plea was entered on the record, 
defendant signed an affidavit stating that on about August 21, 
1984, within Salt Lake County, defendant intentionally damaged 
the building of another, by fire or explosives, and the damage 
exceeded $5,000. The affidavit states that defendant 
understands he is pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to a 
third degree felony and that the punishment may be zero to five 
years in prison, a $5,000. fine, or both. The affidavit also 
states the guilty plea is freely and voluntarily made. Thus, 
despite the court's initial reference to attempted aggravated 
arson and the judgment's reference to attempted aggravated 
arson, considering the record as a whole, it appears defendant 
entered a guilty plea to arson with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences. Therefore, we affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and order the judgment amended to reflect 
defendant's guilty plea to arson rather than attempted 
aggravated arson. Because the sentence for both crimes is 
identical, no correction of sentence is required. 
All other issues raised on appeal have been considered and 
are deemed to be without merit. 
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Prayer 
Petitoner, Darrel E. Brady 
respectfully requests that 
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under Anders v California 
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Jurisdiction 
The judgement of the Utah Court of Appeals 
for / was entered on February 14th 1990 
(Motion for Rehearing) 
This petition for Certiorari^ 
is within ninety days of thq 
date. 
t 
Constitutional Provisions Involved 
(A) United States Constitutional Ammendment 
XTT 
The Fourteenth Ammendment to 
the Constituion provides in 
pertinent port as follows: 
.... nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty,or] 
property without due process 
of law. 
8. 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioner Darrel E. Brady plead quilty to a simple arson 
in a Utah State Prision fire, he plead guilty to an Olford 
plea on April 23, 1985 
On August 21st 1984 petitioner attempted tc| excape from 
the Utah State Prision and while he was going out the front 
door, a fire started in the industries area of the prision 
which was (3) three control centers across the prisions front 
door. 
Petitoner was appointed counsel and counsel states 
(assistant county attorney) in January of 1985 had a plea 
negotiation Petitioners had told his counsel that he would 
plead to anything related to the attempted excape but he 
knew nothing about the fire. The January 1985 plea 
negotiation between counsel was done without petitioners 
knowledge. Petitioners, when advised of the negotiation, 
made his position on any related plea arrangements,clear, 
ther was not to be any and consequently sought pro se status 
to stop any further negotiations, stand by counsel was 
appointed. 
9. 
Petitioner, on April 22nd, 1985, one day before trial 
at a pre-trial conference, petitioner was told by the trial 
court that he should consider the plea bargin that had been 
offered in January1985, some ninety days previously. Petitioner 
replied "I AM READY FOR TRIALV 
In effect, the very next morning on the eve of the trial 
petitoner while in the holding area, got dressed in his suit 
and was prepared for trial, with all witnesses subpointed. 
Noone ever approached petitioner for any plea negotiations 
that morning. At that time Judge Banks sent the baliff for 
petitoners and his stand by attorney, to be brought to 
chambers, present ther was the court and the assistant county 
attorney.At this time the court initated "all" conversation 
and plea negotiansincluding telling petitioners that if he 
didnt take the plea bargin, that he would never get out bec-
ause of the habitiual criminal count. 
Petitioner refused and told the court, I cant admit 
to the arson because I didnt know anything about it but 
would plead to any excape charge. 
The Court, the Assistant County Attorney, and the 
petitioners strenously encouraged petitioner to plead guilty. 
Then the court said petitioner could plead to an Alford 
plea and explained that the plea to petitioner. All this 
10. 
overcame petitioners obvious reluctance to plead guilty. 
Petitioners was misled by the court concerning appeal, 
(see guilty plea transcript, Appendix "E" ), in that petit-
ioner, if found guilty by a jury (page #8- trans. Appendix"!!") 
(L-20-25) would have no rights to appeal and would have no 
rights to challange the constitutional1ity, both Utah State 
and United States constitution 
Petitioner repeatedly requested (see Appendix D 3(e)) 
to be furnished all transcripts of case, including the 
coercive attempt by the court on April 22nd 1985 to get 
petitioner to plea bargin. At the pre-trial conference 
petitioner specifically rufused any attempts to plea bargin. 
Petitioner still has not recieved the April 22nd 1985 tran-
script . 
As portrayed in the Appendix E transcript at page #8 
lines 20-25 petitioner, while in chambers was misled conc-
erning what would be his legal status, should he go to trial. 
Also involved was the threat that "if convicted petit-
ioner would never get out" This allegation by petitioner 
was never refuted. Mr.Iwasaki (stand by counsel)I said, 
he could not remember very much about the off th record, in 
chambers pre-trial conference. In White v Maryland 396 U.S. 
1963 the United States Supreme Court held absence of relevant 
evidence and transcripts materials to the defense "the silent 
record shall speak for the defendant. See alsoState v Punch 
709 F. 2d 889, 891-95 (1983) (maintained innocence and only 
observed the version of indictment read to him) 
Petitioner maintains that everything that occured after 
the in chambers coercion was illegal as petitioners ability 
to comprehend was gone. 
12. 
BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
Reasons for Granting the Writ 
Petitioner was coerced by the court. The trial court had no legal 
right to bring up the plea bargin, as ther was no previous plea negotians 
of any kind since petitioner went pro se some ninety days before and 
the court, less than 24 hours before had tried to coerce petitioner 
and was told "TTo plea bargin, In ready for trial." 
A. Petitioners plea was involentary and therefore in violation 
of due process of law, due the courts intervention at a time when 
no plea bargin negotians were in process. There were no ongoing 
plea negotians. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
Darrel E. Brady, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I Cowft rf Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 886278-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea to attempted Aggravated arson, 
claiming the trial court improperly participated in the plea 
bargain agreement and his plea was not entered 
or knowingly. We affirm. 
into voluntarily 
In 1981, defendant was convicted of several crimes and 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. On August 21, 1984, 
while serving that sentence, a fire was started at the prison 
and shortly thereafter, defendant escaped. Defendant was 
apprehended outside the prison and charged witn escape. 
Several weeks later, he was charged with aggravated arson and 
with being a habitual criminal. 
In January 1985, defendant's attorney informed defendant 
by letter of a proposed plea bargain in which defendant would 
plead to a third degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the 
escape and habitual criminal charges. After receiving the 
attorney's letter, defendant informed the attorney he wished to 
proceed pro se. 
On the morning of trial, the county atto 
his attorney, and the judge held a pre-trial m6e 
chambers and discussed entering a plea. Although 
does not contain a transcript of the in-chambe 
the State and defendant agree that during the 
defendant was informed he could enter an Alfor 
degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the 
ney, defendant, 
ting in 
the record 
s discussion, 
iscussion, 
plea to a third 
escape and 
habitual criminal charges.1 Immediately aftei: the meeting 
defendant, the prosecutor, his attorney and the judge entered 
the courtroom and discussed the plea arrangement. The court 
indicated that based upon the in-chambers discussion, defendant 
wanted to withdraw his plea of not guilty to aggravated arson 
and enter an Alford plea to attempted aggravated arson. The 
court then discussed some of the rights defendant was waiving, 
obtained defendant's statement that the plea was free and 
voluntary and had defendant execute an affidavit. After that 
discussion, defendant's attorney stated that the plea defendant 
was entering was to simple arson. The court ^hen stated 
And to the charge under the amendecfl 
information of aggravated arson, your 
former plea of not guilty is set aside, 
and to the charge of arson, a third degree 
felony as I've explained to you, which 
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about August 21, 1984 in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that the defendant, Darrell Eugene 
Brady, a party to the offense, did 
unlawfully and intentionally damage the 
structure of a building and said value of 
said destruction exceeded $5,000 by the 
means of fire or explosives, what fiow is 
your plea, guilty or not guilty. 
Defendant responded that his plea was guilty, pursuant to 
Alford. The affidavit defendant signed indicated that he was 
pleading guilty to the charge of arson, a third degree felony, 
pursuant to Alford. The judgment, however, states that 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated 
arson. 
Two years later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating: 
1^  In North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25 ^1970), the United 
States Supreme Court held that "[a]n individual accused of a 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling to 
or unable to admit his participation in the aqts constituting 
the crime." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides, 
. . • may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
leave of the court." Further the denial of a 
withdraw a guilty plea will be reversed only when 
appears the trial court has abused its discretl 
Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 
defendant entered his plea prior 
1309 (Utah 1987), we apply the test set forth 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v 
310 (Utah 1985). See Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 
to that test, we examine whether the record as a 
establishes that defendant entered his plea with 
and understanding of its consequences. Id. 
A plea of guilty 
shown and with 
motion to 
it clearly 
ion. State v. 
1988). Because 
to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
in WarneE vt 
709 P.2d 
93. According 
whole 
full knowledge 
ree 
Defendant contends, and the record reflect 
entered his plea in court on the record, he 
pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to arson 
stated that there had not been any promises 
than that stated in court, and that he was f 
voluntarily entering the plea of guilty under 
Defendant stated that he understood by enteri 
waiving his constitutional rights, which the 
explained to him. Defendant then entered his 
pursuant to Alford. After the plea was entered 
defendant signed an affidavit stating that on 
1984, within Salt Lake County, defendant intent 
the building of another, by fire or explosives 
exceeded $5,000. The affidavit states that 
understands he is pleading guilty, pursuant to 
third degree felony and that the punishment 
years in prison, a $5,000. fine, or both. The 
states the guilty plea is freely and voluntari 
despite the court's initial reference to at 
arson and the judgment's reference to attempted 
arson, considering the record as a whole, it a 
entered a guilty plea to arson with full 
understanding of its consequences. Therefore, 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
guilty plea and order the judgment amended to 
defendant's guilty plea to arson rather than a 
aggravated arson. Because the sentence for 
identical, no correction of sentence is required, 
is, that when he 
understood he was 
Defendant also 
made to him other 
ly and 
Alforfl. 
rig the plea he was 
court had 
plea of guilty 
on the record, 
about August 21, 
ionally damaged 
and the damage 
defendant 
Alford, to a 
be zero to five 
affidavit also 
Jly made. Thus, 
tempted aggravated 
aggravated 
bpears defendant 
knowledge and 
we affirm the 
Withdraw his 
reflect 
ttempted 
both crimes is 
Defendant has failed to show good tause as 
to why his plea should be set aside. The 
terms of the plea negotiation were 
discussed and outlined in correspondence 
between the prosecutor and defense counsel 
before the parties appeared in court for 
entry of the plea. Judge Banks made a 
finding that the plea was voluntarily made 
and defendant has failed to produce 
evidence to support his claim that the 
plea was coerced and therefore a nullity, 
or for any other reason that the p+ea 
should be set aside. 
This appeal followed. 
Defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly 
participated in the plea bargain agreement and coerced him to 
enter a plea. Generally, the trial court's p4 
plea negotiations is not to be encouraged due 
that a trial court's participation might have 
on defendant. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utj 
Further, Rule 11 provides that the judge shal4 
in plea discussions prior to any agreement by 
attorney and defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 
(1989). However, where there is no record evij 
trial court participated in the agreement or that the judge's 
actions coerced defendant to plead guilty, Rul 
violated. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301. In this cas 
indication that the trial judge participated i| 
negotiations is defendant's recollection that 
explained to him that he could enter his plea 
Alford and thereby not admit the acts supporti 
We therefore find that the record does not support the 
contention that the judge improperly participa 
negotiations. 
rticipation in 
to the danger 
a coercive effect 
ah 1986). 
not participate 
the prosecuting 
5-ll(8)(a) 
dence that the 
e 11 is not 
e, the only 
n plea 
the court 
pursuant to 
ng the charge. 
ted in the plea 
Defendant also contends he was improperly convicted of 
attempted aggravated arson because the in-chambers discussion 
led him to believe he was going to enter an Alford plea to 
simple arson. In the transcript, the judge re] 
plea of attempted aggravated arson and a plea 
defendant claims, he was confused when he pled 
State concedes that the record from the taking 
plea is confusing and agrees that the plea ant 
entered was to arson. Accordingly, the State 
sentence be corrected to reflect defendant's 
arson. Further, because the statutory 
the State claims, no correction of sentence is 
fers to both a 
of arson. Thus, 
guilty. The 
of the guilty 
icipated and 
requests that the 
cbnviction for 
sentences are the same, 
required. 
All other issues raised on appeal have been considered and 
are deemed to be without merit. 
RgjgriTal^. G a r f f , 
^ ^ j J L h M. B i l l i s, Judg 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
